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One of the greatest concerns related to the popularity of GPS-enabled devices and applications
is the increasing availability of the personal location information generated by them and shared
with application and service providers. Moreover, people tend to have regular routines and be
characterized by a set of “significant places”, thus making it possible to identify a user from his/her
mobility data.
In this paper we present a series of techniques for identifying individuals from their GPS move-
ments. More specifically, we study the uniqueness of GPS information for three popular datasets,
and we provide a detailed analysis of the discriminatory power of speed, direction and distance of
travel. Most importantly, we present a simple yet effective technique for the identification of users
from location information that are not included in the original dataset used for training, thus raising
important privacy concerns for the management of location datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current and past location information can be consid-
ered as the most sensitive data for an individual [1, 2].
This is particularly true when entire trajectories of in-
dividuals are collected and stored by applications and
service providers. Indeed, companies, such as telecom-
munication operators and service providers, and govern-
mental organizations have access to large collections of
person and communication data, which may be used for
maintaining and managing communications services, se-
curity and surveillance: these include person location
data, which can be collected from GPS devices, cellular
phone usage and WiFi hotspots.
In particular, with the increasing availability and pop-
ularity of embedded GPS receivers into personal devices
and the ability to locate cellular phone users from their
interactions with network antennas [3], new opportuni-
ties arise for gaining knowledge about person movement
behavior. An increasing number of researchers has been
investigating new ways to mine this wealth of location-
based data. Examples include the prediction of the future
location of a person [4], their mode of transport [5] and
the identification of individuals from a sample of their
location data [6]. In [7] it was shown that there is a high
degree of temporal and spatial regularity in human tra-
jectories: people are more likely to visit an area if they
have been frequently visited it in the past. Moreover,
the time a person returns to a location is very likely to
be close to that of his/her previous visits. Thus, given a
geographic trajectory, i.e., a collection of chronologically
ordered visited locations, a potential attacker can dis-
cover a considerable amount of information about that
person, such as their home, place of work, interactions
with other people and visits to sensitive locations.
The focus of this work is on location based fingerprint-
ing: the aim is to identify individuals from their move-
ment behavior. As with identifying individuals by the
ridges on their finger, the ability to identify them by
their mobility traces depends on the uniqueness of the
mobility data associated with them. By uniqueness here
we mean the extent to which a recorded location in a
dataset is shared among different individuals, i.e., the
less shared a location is, the more unique it is. Also, as
with traditional fingerprinting, some information about
the person to be identified needs to have been previously
recorded. A recent contribution in this sense is repre-
sented by the work of de Montjoye et al. [6], where the
authors are able to identify users from a small subset of
their location records taken from mobile phone service
antennas. We would like to underline a major difference
between this work and that by de Montjoye et al., as in
theirs the training set also includes the points used for
the testing and the mobility traces are extracted from
mobile operators’ call data records, instead of exact GPS
points.
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we present
the first evaluation of the uniqueness of GPS data traces
and we show that, with the high precision of GPS, a
small number of mobility points, even not present in the
given mobility databases used for classification, is suffi-
cient to accurately identify individuals. More specifically,
the contribution of our work is threefold: Firstly, we show
that it is possible to identify individuals with great accu-
racy using various types of movement data such as speed,
direction and distance of travel recorded by means of
GPS devices. This suggests that additional care is neces-
sary when anonymized data, also not containing exact ge-
ographic coordinates, are publicly released. Secondly, we
provide an extensive evaluation of the uniqueness of GPS
mobility traces by means of three real-world datasets,
namely CabSpotting [8], CenceMe [9] and GeoLife [10].
We consider both spatial as well as spatio-temporal in-
formation, and we show that, in the datasets being inves-
tigated, as little as two points are sufficient to uniquely
identify nearly all the users. We also evaluate the impact
of the dataset size and the precision of the GPS coordi-
nates on the uniqueness of the data. Our findings show
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2that, in some datasets, it is possible to reduce the average
uniqueness by means of spatio-temporal coarsening and
achieve a given k-anonymity [11, 12]. Finally, we intro-
duce a simple yet effective technique for the identification
of users from location information that are not included
in the original dataset used for extracting user mobility
signatures. We also propose a way to measure the extent
to which a dataset can resist to an identification attack
based on the techniques proposed in this paper.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
Section II describes the datasets used in this study. Sec-
tion III introduces our framework for the evaluation of
the uniqueness of mobility data and the identification of
users by means of previously unseen points. Section IV
presents an extensive experimental evaluation on real-
world datasets, and we summarize our main findings in
Section V. Finally, we review the related work in Sec-
tion VI and we conclude the paper summarizing its main
contributions in Section VII.
II. DATASET DESCRIPTION
In this study we consider three widely used mobility
datasets, namely CabSpotting [8], CenceMe [9] and Ge-
oLife [10]. Note that we will use only the latitude, lon-
gitude and timestamp values from these datasets, and
discard any other additional information, e.g., altitude.
Moreover, the traces in all datasets are anonymized and
each mobility trace is given a pseudo-identity.
CabSpotting [8] is a GPS trace collection of 536 taxi
cabs in the San Francisco Bay Area taken over a period
of 30 days. The locations are recorded with a spatial
and temporal resolution of 5 decimal digits and 1 sec-
ond, respectively. This dataset has been recently used by
Piorkowski et al. [20] to show that certain macroscopic
characteristics specific to clustered mobile wireless net-
works are prevalent in real mobility traces. The inherent
characteristics of this dataset, such as common routes
of taxis and the fact that the trajectories are spatially
constrained to lie on the streets, i.e., the points are less
unique, make it particularly challenging and thus of spe-
cial interest for our study.
CenceMe [9] is a dataset of GPS recorded locations
with high-level user activity, such as sitting, walking and
running, collected by means of mobile phones and in-
volving 20 participants during 2 weeks. The locations
are recorded with a spatial and temporal resolution of 6
decimal digits and 1 hour, respectively. The participants
are students and staff members of the Departments of
Computer Science and Biology at Dartmouth College,
with most of the participants activity based in the town
of Hanover, in New Hampshire, USA. The dataset was
originally collected to study new techniques for the opti-
mization of continuous sensing applications [21]. Despite
being a relatively small sized dataset, we decided to in-
clude it in this study because of its interesting character-
istics. In fact, the locations of the participants during the
day are likely to be confined to a limited set of academic
buildings and recreational facilities on campus.
GeoLife [10] is a dataset of GPS traces of 182 users
recorded over a period of five years, from April 2007 to
August 2012. The dataset was collected by Microsoft Re-
search Asia and contains information about participants
mainly located in Beijing. The locations are recorded
with a spatial and temporal resolution of 6 decimal dig-
its and 1 second, respectively. For the purpose of the
present study, we limit our analysis to the period from
January 2008 to December 2008, thus discarding any user
that was not active in this time window. We also exclude
from our analysis those participants that are not located
in Beijing, yielding a total of 70 users. We stress that this
is done to maximize the spatial and temporal overlap of
the trajectories by excluding those that are spatially or
temporally isolated and restricting the analysis to the
period and region of maximum activity: this process in-
creases the complexity of the identification task.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we show how to evaluate the uniqueness
of GPS mobility traces and we propose a technique for
the identification of people by means of mobility data. To
this end, we propose to use a distance function between a
trajectory and a set of sampled points where the spatial
distance between two spatio-temporal points is smoothed
according to their temporal difference. Note that in this
paper we assume that, given a dataset, each person is
assigned a single trajectory, where a trajectory is a set
of GPS points visited by the individual. More precisely,
each GPS point p is a triplet (latp, longp, timep) defining
the spatial and temporal coordinates of p.
A. Classification of Previously Seen Points
We first consider a scenario in which the attacker is
given a number of anonymized points sampled from a
person’s mobility trace and tries to identify which mobil-
ity trace these points came from, by comparing the given
points to a dataset of mobility traces. This type of attack
relies on the underlying uniqueness of a person mobility
trace and thus it is considered successful if comparisons
reveal the given points can be associated with a small
number of person mobility traces. By uniqueness here
we mean the extent to which the data is shared among
different individuals, i.e., the less shared a location is, the
more unique it is. Note that in this scenario the points
are not removed from the mobility trace, and, as a result,
the design of this classification system is straightforward
and computationally inexpensive. In our implementation
each point of a user is stored in a hash set, which allows
searching in constant time. When given a set of points
to classify, we simply identify the number of users which
contain all of them.
3In addition to this, we also examine the situation in
which the attacker has access to alternative movement
information. More precisely, we study the uniqueness of
information describing either the distance covered, the
average speed or the average angle of travel, over a given
time window. Recall that GPS coordinates usually con-
sist of pairs of latitude, longitude points. In order to
compute the distance between two pairs of GPS coor-
dinates we use the well known Haversine formula [13],
which gives the shortest distance in kilometers between
two locations along the surface of the Earth in a suitable
metric[14]. We measure the direction of travel between
two points as the initial bearing. The average direction
over a specified time interval is calculated by weighting
the direction by the distance traveled in that direction.
For example, if a user travels 1 km in the direction 45◦
and 2 km in the direction 90◦, the weighted average di-
rection in this case would be 75.36◦. With the additional
information of a timestamp, kilometers per hour speed
can be easily calculated as well.
B. Classification of Previously Unseen Points
In the classification of unseen spatial and spatio-
temporal points, an attacker is given a sample of
anonymized points P which have been removed from a
person’s mobility trace M , i.e., a set of visited spatio-
temporal points. As in the classification of previously
seen points, an attack is successful if it associates cor-
rectly these points to one or a small number of person
mobility traces. Unlike the classification of previously
seen points, it is difficult for an attacker to fully validate
the correctness of the results from their attack, as the
given points may seem to be most similar to one mobil-
ity trace, when in reality they belong to another person’s
mobility trace. This type of attack assumes that there
exists a relationship between points in a user mobility
trace, i.e., the points being classified should lie spatially
and temporally close to the trajectory of the user they
belong to. Provided that the spatio-temporal points are
sampled densely enough, this is indeed generally true,
as researchers have shown that there is a high degree of
temporal and spatial regularity in human trajectories [7].
Note that unlike in the scenario described in the previ-
ous subsection, the design of this identification method
is more complicated and computationally expensive, due
to the need to evaluate the distance function between a
given sample set of points and a set of mobility traces.
Finally, we stress that in a general scenario the set of
points P and the mobility trace M may actually belong
to different datasets. In this case, the task of the attacker
is that of transferring the identity information from the
labeled dataset containing M to the anonymized set of
points P .
In order to evaluate the similarity between sets of
spatio-temporal points, we propose to adapt the modi-
fied Hausdorff distance [15] to our problem. Recall that
FIG. 1. Trajectory-based identification. Two traces M1
(grey) and M2 (black) along with a set of three points (red)
sampled from M2. These points are classified as belonging to
M2 because the average distance to the corresponding nearest
points in M2 is lower than the average distance to the nearest
points in M1.
the Hausdorff distance between two finite sets of points
A = {a1, · · · , am} and B = {b1, · · · , bn} is defined as
H(A,B) = max(h(A,B), h(B,A)) (1)
where h(A,B) is the directed Hausdorff distance from set
A to B
h(A,B) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
||a− b|| (2)
and || · || denotes the norm on the underlying space. The
modified Hausdorff distance is introduced by Dubuisson
et al. [15] as
hm(A,B) =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
min
b∈B
||a− b||. (3)
where |A| denotes the number of points in A.
In order to extend the modified Hausdorff distance to
our setting, we start by defining the spatio-temporal dis-
tance dst(p1, p2) between two points p1 and p2 as
dst(p1, p2) = ds(p1, p2)e
dt(p1,p2)
τ (4)
where ds denotes the distance computed using the Haver-
sine formula, while dt denotes the absolute time differ-
ence between two points. Here the exponential is used
to smooth the distance between two points according to
their absolute difference of their timestamps. Note that
by setting τ →∞ we ignore the temporal dimension, i.e.,
the distance between two spatio-temporal points reduces
to their Haversine distance.
With Eq. 4 to hand, we can define the distance d(P,M)
between a sample set of points P and a mobility trace M
as
d(P,M) =
1
|P |
∑
p∈P
min
m∈M
dst(p,m) (5)
Fig. 1 shows the intuition behind the use of this distance
function, which can be understood as the average dis-
tance to the nearest point in M for every point in P . We
stress that our distance function is not properly a metric,
as it is not symmetric. However, we choose this distance
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FIG. 2. Average uniqueness of movement information. For each dataset, we measure the average uniqueness of the users’
movements (y-axis) as we vary the number of movement points considered (x-axis). Specifically, each movement point registers
the average distance (red), speed (blue) or direction (green) of travel over a time window of 30 seconds. As expected, the
average uniqueness increases as we add more movements points. The effect varies over the three datasets, but in all of them
the average direction of travel appears to be the most discriminative feature.
measure for its ease of implementation and its robustness
to outliers [15]. As we will show in the experimental part,
the set P may contain as little as 1 point, and thus our
distance function should be fit to work with a small num-
ber of sample points P . On the other hand, if we were
to take the whole trajectory into account when comput-
ing the distance between a single point and M , we would
inevitably end up overestimating the distance between
the point and M . Hence, we had to avoid the use of
other more popular distance functions such as the classic
Hausdorff distance, the Fre´chet distance [16], or the Dy-
namic Time Warping distance [17], which are known to
be particularly sensitive to outliers [16, 18, 19]. In fact,
these metrics either take the maximum over the set of
distances between the points in M and P , or always try
to match P to the whole trajectory M . In other words,
given the nature of our problem, where we do not con-
sider trajectories as sequences of segments, or paths, but
merely as sets of time labeled points, and where the sizes
of M and P can be extremely different, these metric are
not suitable. On the other hand, the Hausdorff distance,
and in particular its modified version, represents a natu-
ral choice for our problem.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we perform an extensive experimental
evaluation of the techniques introduced in Section III on
the real-world mobility datasets described in Section II.
A. Characterization of the Uniqueness of the
Mobility Traces
We evaluate the uniqueness of a mobility trace as fol-
lows. Given a trajectory M , let Sn(M) be a subset of n
points taken from M . We say that Sn(M) uniquely iden-
tifies the single trace M when the number of traces that
contain Sn(M) is one. Let m(Sn(M)) denote the num-
ber of traces which are uniquely identified by Sn(M):
the lower m(Sn(M)) the more unique a trace is. In these
experiments, for each user we sample 1000 random sub-
sets Sn(M). We then evaluate the uniqueness of a hu-
man mobility trace as the percentage of subsets Sn(M)
that matches exactly one trace, i.e., m(Sn(M)) = 1.
For each dataset, the results are presented in terms of
average uniqueness over the whole dataset, with a 95%
confidence interval. The same procedure is repeated for
spatial points, spatio-temporal points and the movement
signatures described in the previous section.
As a first analysis, we evaluate the uniqueness of a sin-
gle spatial and spatio-temporal point. Due to the precise
nature of GPS information, we expect the uniqueness of
these points to be very high, provided that the spatio-
temporal information is sufficiently accurate. In fact, we
observe that taking the temporal dimension into account
raises the uniqueness of the traces to nearly 100%, over
2 out of 3 datasets. In the GeoLife dataset, despite the
high spatio-temporal resolution, we measure a unique-
ness of 89.5%. We suspect that this is due to some du-
plicated trajectories. However, when the spatial location
alone is taken into account, the uniqueness over the three
datasets can be considerably different, remaining around
100% for CenceMe and 89% for GeoLife but dropping un-
der 40% for CabSpotting. This in turn suggests that the
efficacy of anonymization methods that rely on attributes
suppression to enforce k-anonimity [11] is largely depen-
dent on the nature of the dataset. In fact, a possible rea-
son for the high uniqueness of the mobility traces of the
GeoLife and CenceMe datasets is that they contain mo-
bility traces of users through their daily routines which,
unlike the mobility of taxi cabs, contain many personal
and unique locations such as home and work. In partic-
ular, a close look at the traces in the CenceMe dataset
reveals that in several cases the GPS coordinates remain
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FIG. 3. Average uniqueness of spatial information. For each dataset, we measure the average uniqueness of the users’ location
information (y-axis) as we vary the number of data points (x-axis). We consider the GPS location information at different
levels of decimal resolution: 1 digit (red), 2 digits (blue), 3 digits (green), 4 digits (magenta) and 5 digits (black). Decreasing
the decimal place resolution of the GPS coordinates generally leads to a lower average uniqueness, suggesting that spatial
coarsening can help to obfuscate the identity of mobility data users.
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FIG. 4. Effect of the number of users on the average uniqueness. We measure the average uniqueness of the users’ traces
(y-axis) as we vary the number of users in the datasets (x-axis). Moreover, we show how the average uniqueness varies as we
change the number of spatial points considered. Note that as the number of users increases more uncertainty is added to the
identity information. However, we observe that in the CabSpotting dataset the number of spatial points plays a pivotal role in
the determination of the level of uniqueness.
effectively constant for long periods, thus inevitably rais-
ing the uniqueness of that location. This may be for
example the case of a person sitting in his or her office.
Despite making the identification task trivial, this is of
particular interest, as our daily movements patterns do
include this kind of very personal and unique location.
Not only spatial and temporal points do uniquely iden-
tify users, but the characteristics of movements can also
be highly individual. Fig. 2 shows the average unique-
ness as we vary the number of points describing the av-
erage speed, the total distance and the average direction
over a time window of 30 seconds. Note that, due to
the coarser temporal resolution of the CenceMe dataset,
for this dataset we use a time window of 1 hour. As we
can see, the results are largely dependent on the dataset
and on the number of points used. For example, on the
CenceMe dataset as little as 3 points are sufficient to
uniquely identify 100% of the individuals. Most remark-
ably, we observe that in all the three datasets the aver-
age direction of travel is the most discriminative feature,
while the average covered distance is the least discrimi-
native one. In fact, with the exception of the CenceMe
dataset, in the GeoLife and CabSpotting datasets the
average distance is a very poor signature of a person’s
movements, whereas the 5 average direction points are
sufficient to uniquely identify more than 95% of the users.
We then consider spatial information alone, and we
investigate how the uniqueness of traces varies as the
number of sampled points is increased. Moreover, we
show that a few points, even with reduced resolution, are
enough to uniquely identify a large number of the users.
We reduce the resolution of spatial points by truncat-
ing the latitude and longitude values to fewer decimal
places, effectively coarsening the spatial information of
the traces [11, 12]. In the original CabSpotting dataset
the spatial precision of points is of 5 decimal places,
which represent an area of approximately 1.11 by 0.96
meters [22]. A 4 decimal places resolution, on the other
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FIG. 5. Empirical CDF of the geometric separability over the three datasets. For each dataset, we show the cumulative
probability (y-axis) of the per class geometrical separability (x-axis). The red line refers to the case where only the spatial
information is used, whereas the blue line refers to the case in which also time is taken into account. We observe that in general
the addition of the temporal dimension makes the data much easier to separate.
hand, represents an area of approximately 11.09 by 9.55
meters, while a 1 decimal place resolution represents a
patch as large as 11087.4 by 9550.6 meters. Hence, it
is interesting to investigate to which extent this spatial
coarsening can help to obfuscate the identity of mobility
data users. Fig. 3 shows the average uniqueness over the
three datasets as the decimal place resolution and the
number of sampled points vary.
When the full-resolution 5 digits GPS coordinates are
used, we have that in both the CabSpotting and the
CenceMe datasets as little as two points are sufficient
to uniquely identify nearly 100% of the individuals. In
the GeoLife dataset, on the other hand, sampling more
points results in a slower increase of the uniqueness, thus
suggesting the existence of a considerable spatial over-
lap between different traces. In fact, in all the exper-
iments we observe a clear upper bound in the unique-
ness of this dataset, which is due to some of the traces
sharing the exact same series of spatio-temporal points.
Most importantly, Fig. 3 also shows that a considerable
number of users can be still identified by a small frac-
tion of very coarse spatial points. However, we observe
a marked drop of the average uniqueness in the Cab-
Spotting dataset when the decimal place resolution is less
than 4 digits, which once again highlights the fact that
this dataset contains less unique locations than the other
two datasets. Note that, from a practical point of view,
these findings are of particular importance to Android
users, where the location privacy permissions of applica-
tions can be set to access either coarse- or fine-grained
location information[23].
As a last experiment, we measure how the uniqueness
varies as we increase the number of users in the datasets.
Since the uniqueness of the CenceMe dataset is already
near 100% when the whole dataset is considered, we limit
this analysis to the CabSpotting and GeoLife datasets.
Fig. 4 shows the value of the average uniqueness as the
number of users in the datasets increases. The limit case
is that of a dataset containing a single trajectory, which
has 100% uniqueness as there is no uncertainty in the
identity of the user. On the other hand, as the number
of users increases, the uniqueness starts to decrease, since
more and more uncertainty is added to the identity infor-
mation. Remarkably, we see that the number of points
in P plays a fundamental role in the determination of
the level of uniqueness in the CabSpotting dataset. Here
increasing the number of points to 3 or more raises the
uniqueness to 100%, regardless of the number of users in
the dataset.
B. Classification of Previously Unseen Data
In this subsection we focus on the problem of classify-
ing unseen points, i.e., points that in our experiments we
assume not present in the datasets associated to certain
individuals, by using the distance function described in
the methodology section. Before this, however, we study
the separation properties of the trajectories for the three
dataset being investigated.
1. Analysis of Trajectory Separability
Before turning to the problem of classifying unseen
points, we propose a simple yet effective way to quantify
the difficulty of the classification problem. More specif-
ically, we propose to measure the geometric separability
of the trajectories of a given dataset [24]. The Geomet-
ric Separability Index was introduced by Thornton [24]
to measure the degree to which data belonging to the
same class tend to cluster together. This is done by es-
timating the proportion of points in the dataset whose
nearest-neighbour belongs to the same class, i.e.,
GSI(f) =
|{p|f(p) = f(n(p))}|
N
, (6)
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FIG. 6. Optimization of the τ parameter. For each dataset, we measure the impact of the value of τ (x-axis) on the average
classification accuracy (y-axis). The optimal τ is selected by maximizing the classification accuracy on 3 unseen points. Note
the difference in the y-axis scale.
where N is the number of points in the dataset, n(p) de-
notes the nearest-neighbor of p and f is a binary function
assigning a point to a class. Note that the GSI measures
separability in a more general sense than linear separabil-
ity. In fact, the data may be non-linearly separable but
still geometrically separable. Consider for example two
sets of points along concentric circles with different diam-
eters, which are not linearly separable yet are clustered
along clearly separate structures. In general, the GSI
ranges from 0 to 1, with a value of 1 for two completely
separated clusters and a value of 0 for two completely
overlapping clusters.
The GSI was originally introduced to measure the sep-
arability of data in a binary classification problem, i.e.,
where the number of possible classes is two, while here we
are dealing with a number of classes equal to the number
of users in the dataset. Moreover, we can see that the
GSI does not take the size of the different classes into
account. That is, a large and easily separable class will
impact the GSI much more than another small and non-
separable class. Here we propose to take the average GSI
(aGSI) over all the classes, which we define as
aGSI(f) =
1
N
∑
c∈C
|{pc|f(pc) = f(n(pc))}|
NC
, (7)
where f is a function that assigns a class to a point, C is
the set of classes, pc denotes a point belonging to c ∈ C
and NC denotes the number of such points.
We find that the aGSI of the CabSpotting dataset is
0.0741, the aGSI of the CenceMe dataset is 0.8438 and
the aGSI of the GeoLife dataset is 0.4437. This confirms
our observation that the CabSpotting dataset is the most
challenging one. Fig. 5 shows the empirical cumulative
distribution function of the per class geometrical separa-
bility over the three datasets. Here the red line shows
the empirical CDF when only the spatial information is
used, while the blue line refers to the case in which also
time is taken into account. Note in particular that in
the GeoLife dataset the addition of the temporal dimen-
sion makes the data much easier to separate. Moreover,
Fig. 5 highlights once again that the CabSpotting dataset
is the most challenging one in that the different trajec-
tories show a high degree of overlap.
2. Classification Results
We now turn to the problem of classifying unseen
points. Here, we do not analyze the uniqueness of a sub-
set of points from a mobility trace, but instead we analyze
the similarities between a set of given points, which we
refer to as sampled points, and a set of disjoint mobility
traces. The similarity is then used to identify a person as-
sociating him/her with the nearest mobility traces using
Eq. 5. Note that we are working under the assumption
that the sampled points all belong to a single mobility
trace. For each trace in the dataset we sample a set of n
points and we compute the nearest and the second near-
est neighbor among the labeled traces, where the above
points have been removed. We repeat this procedure
100 times to compute the average classification accuracy,
with a 95% confidence interval. For each dataset, the re-
sults are presented in terms of average accuracy over the
whole dataset. Recall that in these datasets each person
is mapped to a single trajectory. Hence, the accuracy
is measured as the number of individuals that are cor-
rectly matched to their trajectory, where an individual is
represented by the set of n sampled points defined above.
Recall that according to Eq. 4 the distance between
two spatio-temporal points p1 and p2 is computed as
ds(p1, p2)e
dt(p1,p2)
τ , where τ controls the effect of the tem-
poral difference between the two points. In other words,
the larger the value of τ , the less relevant is the temporal
difference between the points into account. As a con-
sequence, the distance between a set of spatio-temporal
points and a mobility trace (Eq. 5) also depends on the
choice of the parameter τ . We randomly partition each
dataset into a training and test set, where each trace con-
tains 50% of the original GPS points. Given the train-
ing set of traces, we calculate the optimal order of mag-
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FIG. 7. Average classification accuracy over the three datasets. For each dataset, we show the average classification accuracy
(y-axis) as we increase the number of sampled spatio-temporal points (x-axis). Note that as little as 1 spatio-temporal point
is sufficient to correctly classify more than 90% of the users, in 2 out of 3 datasets. Here the red line refers to the case where
the correct trajectory is the nearest one, whereas the red line refers to the case where the correct trajectory is either the first
or the second nearest one.
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FIG. 8. Effect of training set size on the classification ac-
curacy. We measure the average classification accuracy (y-
axis) as we increase the number of sampled spatio-temporal
points (x-axis) for the CenceMe dataset. We show how the
results vary as we reduce the size of the observed traces in the
CenceMe dataset to 20% (blue), 40% (red), 60% (green) and
80% (magenta) of the original size. The results show that our
classification framework is robust with respect to the number
of available observations.
nitude of τ in terms of average classification accuracy
of 3 test points. Fig. 6 shows the value of the average
classification accuracy for increasing values of τ , with a
95% confidence interval. We observe that in all the three
datasets the optimal value of τ varies between 10−2 and
10−3. This confirms the intuition that the temporal di-
mension has to be taken into account to yield a higher
classification accuracy. Indeed, choosing a small value of
τ amounts to restricting the focus of our nearest neighbor
search to those points that lie both spatially and tempo-
rally close to that being classified, which are indeed more
likely to belong to the correct trace. Also, note that in
the CabSpotting dataset the accuracy of our method is
particularly influenced by the value of τ , and thus it is
critical to properly optimize it before proceeding to the
classification phase. On the other hand, we observe that
the accuracy on the GeoLife dataset remains essentially
constant between 10−4 and 10−1. This may be partially
due to the high temporal density of the trajectories. In
91% of the trajectories, in fact, the GPS location was
sampled every 1 ∼ 5 seconds. As a result of this, the
high resolution temporal information (i.e., low τ) can be
used to discriminate between the different trajectories.
This is in stark contrast with the CabSpotting dataset,
where setting the value of τ to low values results in a
sudden drop of performance.
After obtaining the optimal values of τ , we use them
in order to evaluate our classification framework on the
three datasets. Fig. 7 shows how the average classifi-
cation accuracy varies as the number of sampled points
increases. We also consider the situation in which the
correct label is that of the second nearest neighbor. As
shown in Fig. 7, as little as 1 spatio-temporal point is suf-
ficient to correctly classify more than 90% of the users, in
2 out of 3 datasets. Moreover, when the second nearest
neighbor is taken into account, on the same datasets the
average classification accuracy approaches 100%. Once
again, the CabSpotting dataset proves to be the hard-
est to analyze given its inherent characteristics, such as
common routes of taxis and the presence of locations as-
sociated to taxi ranks. Instead, the results related to the
GeoLife and CenceMe datasets imply that it is possible
to correctly identify the user with a very small number
of new observations not present in the original one. In
other words, it is harder to potentially ensure the loca-
tion privacy of the individuals. We conjecture that this
is mainly due to the presence of many personal and thus
unique locations, such as home and workplace locations,
as opposed to CabSpotting.
Finally, we evaluate the impact of the size of the traces
on the classification accuracy. In particular, we reduce
the size of the observed traces in the CenceMe dataset
to 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% of the original size. We
present the result of this experiment on the CenceMe
dataset. Fig. 8 shows how the average classification ac-
9curacy varies as we increase the number of the sam-
pled points, for different sizes of the observed traces.
As expected, reducing the number of observable spatio-
temporal points has the effect of lowering the average
classification accuracy. However, we note that our ap-
proach still performs considerably well when as little as
20% of each trace is considered, thus suggesting a good
robustness against the lack of available observations.
V. DISCUSSION
The results presented in the previous section about
the experimental validation of our approach show that
users can be identified using a few high resolution loca-
tion points. We believe that our findings raise important
privacy concerns with respect to the management, stor-
age and analysis of personal mobility data. Even a single
high precision spatio-temporal point should be treated
with great care in order to preserve the privacy of a user
if additional information is available. More precisely, we
have shown that in the datasets considered in this study
a single spatio-temporal point is sufficient to uniquely
identify nearly 100% of the individuals. When only spa-
tial information is considered, we find that in some cases
the uniqueness of the mobility data can still get close to
100%. In general, a limited number of spatial points is
required to uniquely identify individuals, without having
the points to be classified as part of the given mobility
traces used for training. Even hiding the temporal infor-
mation and coarsening the spatial resolution of the points
may still not be sufficient to ensure the privacy of users.
We have also showed that the movement characteris-
tics of speed, direction and distance of travel are very
sensitive from a user privacy perspective: access to a
user record of any of these movement characteristics,
e.g., compass recordings, should be handled with a simi-
lar level of privacy as precise positioning data. Mobility
points which have been removed from a trace should also
be treated with great care. Our study of previously un-
seen points showed that, in the majority of cases, given a
limited number of GPS spatio-temporal points it is pos-
sible to identify the traces from which the points origi-
nated, thus allowing a potential attacker to transfer the
identity information from a non-anonymized dataset of
trajectories to an anonymized set of points.
The ability to identify individuals from previously seen
points depends on the uniqueness of the dataset of mobil-
ity traces taken into consideration. At the same time the
ability to identify individuals from unseen points depends
on both the uniqueness and the possibility of associating
a user to a finite number of significant places or areas.
Therefore, we expect that the ability to identify individ-
uals who spend a large amount of time in the same loca-
tions should be generally low. However, in this paper we
have successfully tested our identification technique on
a dataset of taxi traces, which, due to the fact that the
trajectories are spatially constrained to lie on the streets,
is characterized by a high number of common locations.
VI. RELATED WORK
In the recent years, due to the increasing popularity
of mobile phones (now mostly equipped with GPS re-
ceivers), there has been a strong interest in the analysis
of location privacy risks and potential countermeasures.
With respect to the problem of identification of people
from human mobility, Gruteser et al. [25] exploited the
associativity of GPS mobility traces to identify individ-
ual traces from a collection of unlabeled traces of mul-
tiple users. This unmixing of traces is carried out by
identifying different paths in the dataset, under the as-
sumption that a user is likely to continue traveling along
the same route. It is worth noting that their system
is prone to misclassification when paths cross, as it is
unable to infer whether the paths of two or more indi-
viduals actually crossed or just touched. Recently, de
Montjoye et al. have shown how unique the location of
users are when they make or receive mobile phone calls
or text messages [6], or when they perform a credit card
transaction [26]. In [6], each time a user phone call is
started or a text is sent or received, the location of the
nearest network service antenna along with the time is
recorded. In [26], on the other hand, each location point
is a triple containing the shop identifier, time and price
of a credit card transaction. Both works analyzed these
location traces to find how many spatio-temporal points
are needed to uniquely identify the user. The main dif-
ference with respect to these works is that in our study
we do not include the points used for the classification
in the training set, i.e., our work also focuses on points
that are not present in the training set. Moreover, de
Montjoye et al. consider traces extracted from call data
records or shops visits, whereas in this work we consider
GPS data points.
Golle and Partridge [27] have shown how the unique-
ness of home/work pairs can be used to carry out in-
ference attacks to reveal the identity of a user from an
anonymized trace. In addition to this, Ranjan et al. [28]
have recently examined the use of mobile phone call
records for studies in human mobility and concluded that
they can be very biased to home and work locations.
Another related study is presented in [29], where mo-
bile users are identified given a set of locations collected
from mobile phone GSM Call Data Records. However,
the locations in these recordings usually correspond to
areas where a user made a mobile phone call or text,
i.e., locations which are more likely to correspond to the
home and workplace of a user, which are again inherently
unique locations. Rossi and Musolesi recently proposed
a trajectory-based and a frequency-based attack against
Location-based Social Network (LBSN) users [30]. Note,
however, that in the context of LBSNs a location point is
a check-in at a venue. Check-ins are generally very sparse
in space and time, and thus very different from the traces
that we considered in this study. Monreale et al. [31], on
the other hand, proposed to adopt the privacy-by-design
paradigm in big data analytics to reach a trade-off be-
10
tween data privacy and quality of the data. For the case
of GPS mobility traces, they propose to use a Voronoi
tessellation to ensure k-anonymity while maximizing the
quality of the anonymized data.
Note that a number of works in the literature have
studied the problem of location prediction and the re-
lated privacy implications [4, 32]. However, while in the
case of location prediction one is interested in prevent-
ing a potential attacker to infer the next place visited
by an individual, in our paper we focus on the problem
of identifying the individual himself/herself, rather than
the location. Given a location prediction model one can
also infer the identity of a user by means of maximum
likelihood estimation. However, the aim of this paper is
to show that extremely accurate yet less elaborate and
computationally demanding techniques can be used to
disclose a user’s identity. Finally, another related work
is [33], in which the author studies the more specific prob-
lem of inferring the home location of a user participating
in a database of GPS traces. Given the estimated co-
ordinates of a user’s home, a simple Web-based lookup
is used to reveal his/her name. The focus of this work
is different: in fact, we are interested in evaluating the
uniqueness of GPS information and the extent to which
an unseen set of points can be linked to the underly-
ing generating trajectory, thus revealing the identity of a
user.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a series of techniques
for the analysis and identification of GPS mobility traces.
We have firstly showed that it is possible to identify users
with great accuracy using movement data such as speed,
direction and distance of travel. Secondly, we have eval-
uated the uniqueness of GPS mobility traces using three
popular datasets. We have analyzed the use of both spa-
tial as well as spatio-temporal information to perform
this task and we have showed that, in the datasets taken
into consideration, as little as two spatial points are suf-
ficient to uniquely identify nearly 100% of the users. We
have also evaluated the impact of the dataset size and the
precision of the GPS coordinates on the uniqueness of the
data, and we have found that, in some datasets, coars-
ening the GPS precision results in a drastic reduction
of the average uniqueness. Finally, we have introduced
a simple yet efficient technique for the identification of
users from location data that are not included in the
original datasets used for the training. In an attempt
to quantify the extent to which a dataset can resist an
identification attack like the one proposed in this paper,
we have proposed a simple yet efficient way to estimate
the separability of the trajectories of a given dataset. Fi-
nally, we have showed the effectiveness of the proposed
identification attack on the selected datasets.
We believe that these results raise important privacy
concerns with respect to the treatment of personal mo-
bility data. Future work will investigate the possibility
of exploiting additional mobility and movement informa-
tion including WiFi hotspot access and smartphone sen-
sor readings. We also plan to analyze more refined ob-
fuscation techniques for preserving user privacy based on
the findings of this work.
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